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The State of Theory
in Relation to the
Empirical Analysis
HARRY G. JOHNSON
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
AND UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
The decision to hold the Universities-National Bureau Conference on
Technology and Competition in International Trade was largely moti-
vated by the beliefs that empirical research on patterns of international
trade had revealed and confirmed important technological influences
which were not recognized in the established theory of comparative
cost, and that in the interests of scientific progress it would be highly
desirable to confront empiricists and theoreticians with a stock-taking
of the current treatment of the technology factor in international
economics. The purpose of this paper is to discuss, in the light both of the
literature prior to the Conference and the papers prepared specifically
for the Conference, how far and in what respects there may be said
to be a conflict between the empirical findings and the theoretical models,
and to suggest ways in which any such conflict may be reconciled in
establishing new foundations for future scientific advance.
To begin with, it is, I think, important and necessary to recognize a
crucial difference between the role of theory in the context of empirical
NOTE: This is a revised and extended version of the paper actually presented at
the Conference. This paper and the first version draw heavily on ideas developed
in two earlier attempts of mine to come to grips with the problem of the tech-
nology factor in trade, my Wicksell Lectures of March 1968 [51 and my Interna-
tional Economic Association World Congress paper of September 1968 [6]. In
discussing the state of theory in relation to the technology factor, however, I have
regarded these efforts as not belonging to the literature relevant to the Conference.
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research, and its role in economics In the context of economics
as an empirical science, the function of theory is to cast up empirically
testable and refutable explanatory hypotheses, and the value of a theory the
is to be judged by its explanatory power in comparison with its rivals, the
In the broader context of economics as a systematic approach to the theci
understanding of economic phenomena and as the organization of
disciplined thinking about these phenomena and about policies relating
to them, however, the purpose of theory is to abstract from the com- Oh!1
plexity of the real world a simplified model of the key relationships
between dependent and independent variables, and to explore the positive is
and normative implications of changes in the "givens" of this hypothetical
system. For this purpose, the validity of the empirical foundations of
a theory is, obviously within limits, not of such crucial importance, in
the
the sense that the principles of interrelatedness, of systematic response
to change, and of optimization remain valid in the face of wide variations
relal in assumed economic structure.
The theory of international trade has always been primarily theory
in the second sense. Specifically, it has not been much concerned with
the empirical problems of predicting or prescribing which goods will or
ss1
should be traded by particular countries, or of specifying the character-
Ufl
istics of such goods. Instead, it has tended to draw on prevailing models
of the domestic economy, and particularly of the domestic production
system, as the bases for analysis of the positive and normative aspects
'
I oftrade between national economies with differing production oppor- act
tunities. In this connection, the central contribution to both positive and ore1
normative economics of the theory of international trade has been the
principle of comparative cost—a principle which is not dependent on
any particular assumptions about the nature of production.
Although this way of constructing a theory is legitimate enough—
again within limits—for the purposes at hand, it does court the definite larg1
risk of freezing into the theoretical apparatus a model of the production of
process which is gradually being revealed by further research conducted tech
by specialists on domestic economics as inadequate, and consequently in P
of appearing increasingly irrelevant,if not downright in error, as a
inthe real world onci
of experience. As is well-known, the theory of international trade mis!
1Theargument of this and the next two paragraphs was inspired by some to
comments by R. E. Caves on my World Congress paper. TTheory in Relation to Empirical Analysis 11
aics retained the labor theory of value as an explanation of domestic
ally production equilibrium long after that theory had been superseded by
ory the marginalist revolution in the theory of domestic value. Moreover,
als. the efforts of certain neoclassical trade theorists to "patch up" the labor
the theory of value with elements of marginalism and Marshallian partial
of equilibrium analysis resulted in an increasingly cumbersome theoretical
:ing structure, which was eventually discarded in favor of the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model of general equilibrium.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model—which, it should be noted,
:ive is in its contemporary form largely the work of Samuelson and disregards
cal some of the more penetrating insights of the other two economists
of credited with its authorship—builds on the formalization of production
theory in the mathematical concept of the production function. That
ase concept, in its simplest textbook form of a constant returns-to-scale
)flS relation between output of product and inputs of the two homogeneous
factors capital and labor, constitutes an extremely powerful but an
equally extreme and restrictive simplification of production economics.
'or Assuming perfect competition, international indentity of production
er- functions and factors, nonreversibility of factor intensities, and inter-
els national similarity of preferences, the constant returns-to-scale applica-
tion to international trade theory leads to the dual key theorems—the
cts differential factor-endowment explanation of trade theorem and the
factor price equalization theorem. These are undoubtedly elegant the-
nd orems. But they are essentially mathematical theorems whose relevance
he and interest depend not only on the assumptions listed but more
fundamentally on the relevance and usefulness of the production function
concept itself.
— Thefundamental question, which has been raised in general by a
ite large body of recent empirical and theoretical work on the economics
of domestic industrial production and competition and on the role of
ed technological change in economic growth, and which has been raised
:ly in particular by the recent empirical work on the technology factor in
a international trade, is whether orthodox international trade theory has
Id once again reached a position of commitment to an antiquated and
Ic misleading model of the production process, which has to be rejected
ne to further the progress of economic science.
This is a question which needs to be approached with considerabler
12 InternationalTrade: Technology and Theory
care, since there are natural pressures on everyone to arrive at an arisg
answer that justifies and if possible exalts his own choice of research
activity, and it is only too easy to define the problem so as to arrive
at a preconceived answer. For purposes of attack, orthodox theory can
be identified with a specific textbook model designed to illustrate general A
principles but required by the critic to provide a detailed guide to str
empirical research and economic policy-making; for purposes of defense, tha
orthodoxy can be en4owed with a flexibility capable of absorbing any pla
reasonable concept, or defined so broadly and vaguely as to be potentially
consistent with all observed phenomena. These contrasting temptations Ofl
can be illustrated by reference to certain papers prepared for this
Conference. dyn
Bruno, for example, identifies orthodoxy with the staticanalysis pro
of the two-country model, assuming identical given production functions sati
and no capital flows, and sets up in its place a dynamic linear pro- Sb9
gramming optimization model for a single economy with foreign aid
receipts as the key variable. This model, although ingenious in some
respects and presumably useful to the Israeli planning authorities, not m
only involves the purely arbitrary constraints necessary to make a linear in
programming problem both interesting and computable, but so far as the
I can see contains nothing logically inconsistent with the application
of orthodox theory to the same problem and also nothing that adds to
our understanding of comparative advantage or the role of technology I
in determining and changing trade patterns.
On the other hand, Hall and Johnson assert, as if it proved something,
itS
that their paper illustrates that "international flows of technology can the
be studied profitably by means of conventional market-force analysis."
In fact, however, all they show—though in admirably careful detail—
vie1
is that technological transfers can be subjected to cost-benefit analysis. ent
Their case, moreover, is a politically motivated, not market-directed,
transfer; and their most striking finding is that, contrary to prevailing
pat
opinion in the industry itself, the transfer reduced the aircraft's cost of
nol
production. Apparently expert opinion in the industry overestimated star
the importance of engineering efficiency and underestimated the potential
Ifl
cost-saving from substituting cheaper Japanese for more expensive
Ofl
American labor. If such miscalculations of potential comparative cost
are commonplace in industrial management circles, serious questions
my
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arise about (1) the amenability of technological transplantation to
treatment as a rational economic process, and (2) the welfare implica-
rrive tions of relying on the process of competition among large industrial
• firms to diffuse technical progress through the world economy.
neral Again on the side of orthodoxy, Ronald Jones' elegant paper demon-
e to strates a point known to international trade theorists for over a decade,2
that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model can be readily adapted to
place the emphasis of the analysis on technological differences, and goes
iall on to discuss in a perceptive way how the approaches of recent research
on the product cycle and the technology factor can be incorporated in
this formal theory. His analysis, however, markedly fails to capture the
dynamic orientation of that research, but it does underline the key
lysis problem of making the connection between them the development of a
ions satisfactory inducement mechanism for innovation. Moreover, the exten-
pro- sion of the model in the ways he discusses reduces it perilously close to
aid eclectic taxonomy.
ome The purely theoretical paper by Chipman goes beyond Jones' paper
not in applying recent developments in the theory of induced innovations
iear in growth models of international trade. In so doing Chipman confirms
as the flexibility of theory and its power to absorb and apply ideas drawn
from empirical work; but the paper's results are equally remote from
to the real stuff of the world of observation.
The fundamental problem, the conflict between the empirical findings
and the theoretical models, can be seen in part as a continuation
ing, in the international trade field of the debate begun in the 1930's over
can the issue of monopolistic, as contrasted with perfect, competition—
is." with the important difference that monopolistic competition is now
viewed as a rational corollary of the evolution of technology in a free
enterprise system rather than as a manifestation of consumer irrationality.
:ed, The new empirical research stresses the influence on international trade
ing patterns of factors determining monopolistically competitive ability—tech-
nological leadership, economies of scale, and product variation (non-
ted standardization). The orthodox theoretical tradition stresses differences
tial in the classical determinants of wealth—specifically, capital per head—
ive on the assumption of a broadly competitive international economy.
ost 2 For an early extension of the model to the case of technical changes, see
)flS my [3].14International Trade: Technology and Theory
It may be observed parenthetically that the consternation caused to
traditional theorists by the publication of the Leontief paradox can in mon
the light of hindsight be attributed in large part to a misspecification, a hc
based on the identification in the English classical and neoclassical latel
tradition of "capital" with capital equipment, and "labor" with human equ
bodies regardless of skill, of the empirical counterparts of the arguments A
on the production function. The publication of the paradox led imme-
diately, as Hufbauer rather scornfully points out, to tortuous efforts to
• rescue the factor proportions theorem by appeals to differences in demand tioti
conditions, or to the possibility of factor-intensity reversals. However, mot
in the longer run, and partly in response to the development and applica- beel
tion elsewhere in theory and empirical research of the concept of human Stan
capital, the outcome has been the recognition of human skills as an
important constituent of capital together with material equipment and side
structures. This recognition goes a considerable way towards resolving
the Leontief paradox; and, as I have suggested elsewhere (5), the proj
paradox could probably be fully dispelled—at least formally—by exte
extending the concept of capital to include the capitalized value of
F
productive knowledge created by research and development (R&D) hyp
nec expenditure.
It must be admitted, however, that no one has yet performed the
Ofl
required calculations; and also that, as both the Hufbauer paper and stw
the Gruber and Vernon paper have carefully confirmed, the Leontief
paradox in its original form still stands. An explanation of it has been
UC
provided by proponents of the R&D explanation of U.S. comparative
in
advantage in the form of an inverse correlation between material capital
intensity and R&D effort in the United States (see [1] and [7]). Such a
correlation is not necessarily a law of nature: Hirsch's paper finds a
oii
direct correlation in the case of Israeli industry. I'
Returning to the general framework of the debate in terms of classical
comparative cost theory versus monopolistic competition theory, the
difficulty and unsatisfactoriness of that debate in its late-1930's form
Vei
arose from the fact that monopolistic competition theory ispartial
den
equilibrium theory—and therefore permits the insertion of a great deal but
of empirical detail—whereas comparative cost theory is general equilib- tiol
rium theory—and therefore is useful and manageable only when it can
be kept reasonably simple. The rock on which attempts to apply
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dto monopolistic competition theory to international trade theory—initially
a hopeful enterprise—foundered, was the inability of theorists to trans-
ion, late monopolistic competition concepts into forms relevant for general
S1Ca equilibrium analysis.3
m A parallel problem has emerged in the contemporary confrontation
ten S between empirical research emphasizing various aspects of the tech-
nology factor and its dynamic manifestations in international competi-
d tion, and the grand simplicity of the neoclassical general equilibrium
model of comparative advantage. Most of the empirical studies have
been concerned with particular industries or the trade of the United
iCa States—by no means a typical country. And this has left to individual
judgment the question of whether the empirical findings are to be con-
'and
sidered as frontal contradictions of prevailing theory, or as curious or
exceptional cases that are not inconsistent with the central theoretical
propositions but require merely a more sophisticated interpretation and
—b extension of them.
Hufbauer in his excellent paper emphasizes the dangers of testing
hypotheses against a limited range of commodities or countries and the
necessity of comprehensive testing of hypotheses against one another
the on a common (and extensive) set of data. The Gruber and Vernon
and study, though not explicitly devoted to testing rival hypotheses against
itief one another, uses a comparable methodological approach. Hufbauer's
een study finds that the crude factor proportions theory performs surpris-
tive ingly well according to the tests he runs. But so, embarrassingly, does
every other theory proposed by a competent observing economist. The
h a theories that cannot be confirmed empirically, to generalize beyond
s a Hufbauer's study, are those proposed either in support of anti-orthodox
policy prescriptions, or in more or less direct contradiction to com-
ical parative advantage theory in the broad sense—theories not really moti-
the vated by the spirit of scientific research and progress in understanding.
rm The same eclectic conclusion emerges from the study by Gruber and
tial Vernon: R&D expenditure as a surrogate for the technology factor is
eal demonstrably significant as a determinant of international trade patterns,
Lib but itis not a powerful enough influence to supersede more conven-
tional explanations of these patterns.
These results should be encouraging to all honest men—"little truths
On this point, see my [4].
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in every nook" is an undramatic but satisfyingly scholarly interim posi- of pro
tion to have arrived at, and one that opens up rather than closes off new pricesi
avenues of theoretical and empirical research. It is, however, somewhat
discouraging for those whose preference is for simple theories and for the la!
decisive testing of rival hypotheses against one another—especially if of
such testing can shatter orthodoxy in favor of heterodoxy or confirm other
the superiority of empirical-inductive over abstract-deductive approaches these
to international economic research.4 learn
In the summary of his paper Hufbauer expresses something of this tion
discouragement by posing again what I have described as the central deta
issue of the Conference, in terms of the alternative "neofactor propor-
tions" and "neotechnology" accounts of the determination of trade anotlj
patterns, and suggests hopefully that if returns to scale, product age,
and product differentiation could be combined into a single characteris- not ii
tic "that characteristic might prove as powerful as Lary's single measure to Iii
(value added per man) of human and physical capital in explaining monl
trade flows."However, he adds rather wistfully, "the neotechnology
approach is not geared to answering the traditional questions of eco-
nomic inquiry. It can as yet offer little to compare with Samuelson's
splendid factor price equalization theorem."
These remarks of Hufbauer's reveal a certain schizophrenia involving neol
belief in the methodology of empirical testing torival hypotheses
(tempered naturally enough by concern for the chances of victory for
one's favorite candidate) on the one hand, and admiration for the formal
elegance of traditional theory on the other. In my judgment, they both has!
sell the neotechnology approach short and obnubilate the theoretical and
empirical issues. I conclude with three extended comments on these
remarks.
an4
First, it seems to me, as a rank amateur in empirical research in this thei
field, that part of the power of Lary's statistic is that it picks up not only
COIl
the neofactor proportion elements of material and human capital, but
an
also to some extent the neotechnology elements of scale economies, and
cai
Actually, the difference is a matter of degree rather than of kind, for even
the most abstract theory starts from some postulates about the nature of reality nrq
derived, however remotely, from observation, while even the most inductive
approach requires some sort of theory specifying relevant facts. as
Editor's Note: See also the note by Lary in this volume for tests applying the
value added variable to Hufbauer's trade data.
jTheory in Relation to Empirical Analysis 17
of product age and differentiation insofar as these are reflected in selling
new prices. Thus a composite neotechnology index, if one could be con-
what structed, would be entered in a biased test against the Lary statistic, if
for the latter were identified uniquely with the neofactor proportions account
of the courses of trade. If hypotheses are to be tested against each
ifirm other on the basis of single indexes, the indexes must represent the hypo-
iches theses clearly. I would further suggest that something more might be
learned about the neotechnology account from closer study of interna-
this tional differences in the Lary index, though I have not thought of a
ntral detailed research procedure that might be applied.
por- Second, the "adversary procedure" of testing one hypothesis against
rade another is a useful scientific procedure up to a point; but, when both
age hypotheses perform well and seem to be fairly evenly matched, itis
.eris not necessarily the best scientific procedure to send the challenger back
sure to training camp with good advice on how to prepare for the next
fling month. In the realm of ideas, a conflict of equally well (or equally
imperfectly) supported hypotheses may be more fruitfully resolved by
merger into a composite hypothesis.
;on's Specifically,asIhave suggested above and elsewhere[5],the
impression of strong conflict between the neofactor proportions and
ving neotechnology accounts of international trade may reflect merely the
ieses domination of trade theory by the narrow concept of capital as material
for equipment, inherited from the English classical, neoclassical, and now
rmal neo-Keynesian economists. The concept of capital considered relevant
both has now been extended to include human capital—an extension which
and the neotechnology proponents in their roles as adversaries of the factor
hese proportions theory may have accepted too easily for their own good—
and could easily be extended further to include intellectual capital in
this the form of productive knowledge. Such an extension would be fully
only consistent with Irving Fisher's approach to the relation between capital
but. and income. In that context, the neotechnology school can be interpreted
and as insisting on the importance of productive knowledge as a form of
capital that is to be included in the theory of production, rather than as
advancing a theory of international trade patterns to rival the factor
proportions theory. Further, the neotechnology school can be viewed
as emphasizing the process of obsolescence as well as the international
4 e mobility of capital in the form of productive knowledge, an aspect of18internationalTrade: Technology and Theory
capital which has generally been ignored in the neofactor proportions and 4
models. larly
More generally, a synthesis of the presumed rival hypotheses could the
be sought conceptually through revisions of the basic concept of the stand
production function employed in standard trade theory. The standard need
concept implies capital equipment used by homogeneous labor to pro- Sam
duce a given product according to a given technology. A more relevant the e
concept would envisage capital embodied in various forms—natural resp
resources, equipment and structures, human skills, and the productive to
knowledge used to combine them—cooperating to produce bundles of
want-satisfyingcharacteristics embodiedinproducts whose nature
changes as knowledge accumulates and demand changes. In this frame-
work, the theory of comparative advantage would remain neoclassical both
in outline, resting on international differences in capital in the extended and
senseper unit of population, but would have to concern itself also with own
the influences governing the allocation of capital among the different as
forms in which it may be embodied, in countries of different economic
sizes and with different institutions for the education of people and the
support of knowledge production. retica
This observation brings me to my third comment. The appeal of the incou
neotechnology account is not primarily that it is capable of explaining
international trade patterns to a statistically satisfactory degree or better and
than an extended version of the factor proportions model, but that it and
accords more satisfactorily with prevailing ideas about, and observations of i
of, the facts of competition in and between modern industrial states. Con- deve
versely, the dissatisfaction of empirical workers and policy advisers with I
the traditional factor proportions model is not so much that it does not indu
explain trade flows to a satisfactory approximation as that its static and espe4
essentially mathematical formulation—and especially the production foreil
concept—is difficult to square with the apparent facts of competition in
adynamically evolving economy. What practical men—empirical work- Ohi
ers and policymakers alike—see when they look at international corn-
infactor endowments but corpora-
tions competing monopolistically either on the bases of superior tech- the
nology, labor skill, managerial and selling techniques or on the more and
conventional bases of cheap labor and cheap capital.
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tions and dismiss the neofactor proportions theory; on the contrary, particu-
larly in the field of international economic policy, preoccupation with
;ould the manifestations of neotechnolôgy factors is likely to obscure under-
f the standing and facilitate erroneous conclusions. But it does suggest the
idard need for a more sophisticated formulation of the Heckscher-Ohlin-
pro- Samuelson theory, and particularly for a more careful identification of
evant the empirical correlates of its theoretical constructs, most notably with
itural respect to "factors of production" and "products." More bridges need
ictive to be built between the abstract, theoretical model of trade, and the
es of concrete phenomena that concern the practical man. I have suggested
ature above how this problem might be approached.
ame- Further, I would suggest that the neotechnology hypotheses embody
;sical both empirical and theoretical insights and point to both new problems
•nded and new formulations of old problems that ought to be pursued in their
with own right, unconstrained by the ambition to arrive at results as elegant
erent as those of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. The Samuelson factor
.omic price equalization theorem is indeed a splendid proposition; but its chief
zl the practical relevance is to direct attention—by the indirect process of theo-
retical abstraction—to the many reasons why factor prices, and more still,
f the incomes per head, are unlikely to be equalized in the real world as we
ining know it. I believe that the neotechnological account offers a more direct
etter and positive approach to this conclusion and also a more sophisticated
iat it and genuinely dynamic approach to the understanding of the persistence
.tions of inequalities of levels of development and of economic welfare in a
Con- developing world economy.
with I would also suggest that the phenomena of modern international
s not industrial competition, and the policy problems to which they give rise—
and especially those concerning policy toward science and policy toward
ction foreign corporations—raise theoretical issues of far greater complexity
)n in than can be dealt with by the existing theories of tariffs. We are, as
iork- Ohlin emphasized in his paper for the Montreal World Congress mov-
corn-
I ing into a world of freer trade but much more direct governmental inter-
ora- vention in industry. Much of that intervention is directed at mastering
tech- the technology factor as a means of improving the comparative advantage
more and competitive power of the national economy, or of its nationally owned
corporations. Traditional theory offers useful approaches to the analysis
)logy of some of these problems or apparent problems: conventional market
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analysis suffices to dispose of much popular nonsense. But as Posner [91 6.
and Hufbauer himself [2] have pointed out (though in neither case with
enough specificity to clarify the nature of the problem) there is a need
for more fundamental analysis of the welfare effects of technological
leadershipand their diffusion, and correspondingly of the economics of States
government intervention in these matters. So long as one does not ques- 8.
tion the existing system of property rights in knowledge and in its
productive application for profit, it is easy enough to elaborate on the
°fltre traditional case for freedom of trade and freedom of factor movements
and against government interference. But the essential problem is that
relianceon the market principle of rewarding investment in the dis- 10. \A
covery of knowledge, which has the nature of a public good, by granting Product
a temporary monopoly of the use of the knowledge, which makes the
application of it suboptimal, is inherently inefficient. It is the recognition
of questions of this kind and ultimately their solution, rather than the
provision of new solutions to the traditional problems of "income distri-
bution, migration, saving, and investment," that I would expect and
hope to emerge from the challenge to traditional theory posed by the
neotechnology approach.
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his p
The papers of Harry Johnson and Ronald Jones 1concurin the theme theot
that trade theory has been somewhat left behind by the real world,
especially in relation to the phenomenon of technological progress. the
While Jones essentially tries to develop the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin- to ge
Samuelson model of trade theory (which is basically a simplified general have
equilibrium model of the Hicksian variety) in directions implied by the are s
consideration of technical change, the Johnson paper attempts to develop
themes which are on a more "imaginative" scale but which seem to have tions
no theoretical foundations as of the present moment.
nomi
Looking through the Johnson paper, one gets the strong impression
facto
of reading John Williams (a reference which, I assume, Harry Johnson invol
would regard as complimentary): imaginative, insightful, stimulating, But
and pregnant with theoretical implications without actually offering a
new theoretical framework for analysis. But one also gets an occasional
the k
impression of reading someone like Thomas Balogh (a reference which
Harry Johnson would probably not approve of): imaginative and in-
sightful but basically opposed to theoretical modes of reasoning, as when
sents
towards the end of his paper Johnson would gladly sacrifice such theories
as those which yield powerful conclusions with respect to distributive
The




I shall be returning to this question later, but let me say briefly at this ahea
stage that the real problem with Johnson's interesting paper is that the
1Forcomment on Jones see page 93 below.
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"realistic"phenomena which he is dealing with, such as the development
of new technologies in consumption and production, involve essentially
phenomena of imperfect competition for which, despite Chamberlin and
Joan Robinson, we still do not have today any serious theories of general
equilibrium. Therefore, although we can certainly indulge in partial
analyses of imperfectly competitive phenomena, we cannot yet replace
the traditional value-theoretic models of general equilibrium on which
even our welfare analyses are based. Unless therefore we have a new,
powerful, theoretic system (built admittedly on many of the interesting
insights about modern, affluent economies which Johnson offers us in
his paper), we cannot really hope to make a dent in the traditional
he theme theoretical frames of analysis.
world, Having said this, however, let me offer some general remarks about
progress. the important point made by Johnson about the tendency of trade theory
to get stuck with analytical models and questions that nontrade theorists
i general have discarded in favor of more useful constructs. I do think that there
:d by the are several problems for which the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuel-
develop son model has become obsolete: for example, those dealing with ques-
1 to have tions such as process, value-added or "effective" tariffs, as distinct from
nominal tariffs, which require operating with a model involving traded
ipression factors of production or inputs rather than with the traditional model
Johnson involving primary, nontraded factors producing traded consumer goods.
nulating, But then, as we know, trade theory has indeed been adapting itself by
ifering a .usingmore variegated models, better suited to such problems. As for
:castonal . . .
hh
the kinds of questions asked, the recent introduction of dynamic analyses
e W represents an important extension of traditional comparative-static treat-
an
h
ments. For example, Michael Bruno's paper at this Conference repre-
sents an attempt at building a computational, planning model which
S takes into account the fact that comparative advantage shifts over time. riui:e
The very fact that, if you had nonshiftable capital in a world where
es r
over time the foreign rate of transformation faced by a country could
• change, introduces the possibility that someone would have to "look
that ahead": the traditional, static models of gains-from-trade do not yield
such insights, and recent interest in "structural" models has begun to
penetrate through to trade-theoretic analyses as well to Jones.
• ————----•--••-———-——•- - ••-----,---—-24international Trade: Technology and Theory
But I do remain a pessimist at being able to handle the kinds of
broader issues, such as imperfect competition, that Harry Johnson's
stimulating paper raises. It would be valuable to hear from him what
precisely is the manner in which he thinks we can begin to reconstruct
our theories so as to bring them closer to his view of the role of tech-
nology in international trade in a developing world.